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Abstract: This paper presents the outcomes of an anti-corruption educational intervention among 
Ukrainian students based on an online experiment. More than 3,000 survey participants were 
randomly assigned to one of three different videos on corruption and its consequences (treatment 
groups) or a video on higher education (control group). The data suggest a high level of academic 
dishonesty and misconduct among young people, but also a negative attitude towards corruption in 
general, highlighting the ambivalence of corruption in the country. We find that one video, which 
presented a thrilling story about a victim of corruption related to common bribery in an accessible 
way, was effective in promoting awareness of the negative consequences of corruption. In contrast, 
the other two treatment videos, which more closely followed the style of TV news or documentaries 
on corruption, did not generally promote negative attitudes towards corruption. Presenting 
corruption issues in a catchy way therefore appears to matter for the effectiveness of such 
interventions.  
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1. Introduction 
 
Many universities around the world face a lack of academic integrity on the part of a range of 
involved stakeholders: administrators, faculty, staff and students, as well as other related actors and 
agencies (see the recent discussions in Chapman and Lindner, 2016, Bretag, 2016, Denisova-
Schmidt, 2017). Students and their explicit and implicit involvement in such activities are especially 
crucial in this chain. The way young people experience and perceive corruption – its techniques, 
frequency and acceptance – likely affects their professional lives. The potential damage to the 
national and global economy can hardly be underestimated (cf. Cohn, et. al., 2014). Effective 
preventive and control measures are therefore crucial for tackling corruption. One such remedy 
might be an educational campaign using online videos highlighting the negative consequences of 
corruption, the design and effects of which are experimentally examined in this paper.   
More concisely, we investigated how anti-corruption videos accessed via social media influenced 
the attitudes towards corruption of students in Ukraine that participated in an online survey. The 
effects that social media might have on their users are unquestionable, especially in light of the 
recent Facebook-Cambridge Analytica data scandal. Yet social media might also yield positive 
effects positive in terms of anti-corruption civic activities (cf. Marinov and Schimmelfennig, 2015). 
Why Ukraine? Ukraine is a rather unique case: it is one of the most corrupt countries in the world, 
with one of the worst ratings among post-Soviet republics (cf. Transparency International Index).  
At the same time, however, Ukraine is one of the leading countries protesting against corruption1 
(cf. Denisova-Schmidt, et. al., 2018, Denisova-Schmidt and Prytula, 2018). Young people and 
students were the driving forces in all of the recent revolutions in Ukraine (the Revolution on 
Granite in 1990, the Orange Revolution in 2004, and the Revolution of Dignity in 2014).  
Our paper is broadly related to educational campaigns, which can be effective in many different 
contexts. They might, for instance, forestall dangerous situations, increase safety and foster 
professional and personnel success (cf. Schwappach et al. 2013, Cole, 2014, and McGuigan, et. al. 
2016). More specifically, we aim to contribute to the literature on lab, field or natural experiments 
examining causal effects on corruption-related issues; see, for example, the discussions in 
Armantier and Boly (2011, 2013), Barr and Serra (2010), Findley et al. (2014), Holmes (2015), 
Serra and Wantchekon (2012). We are particularly interested in the contradictory effects that 
educational interventions might produce, promoting the behaviour that they are actually trying to 
prevent and/or condemn, for instance by raising awareness about its existence. This may be the case 
                                                 
1 In this paper, we follow the definition of corruption provided by Transparency International (TI): ‘the abuse of 
entrusted power for private gain’. When referring to higher education, we use a broader approach and include as 
corruption ‘the lack of academic integrity’ (Denisova-Schmidt, 2018). 
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with anti-drug media campaigns (Hornik et al. 2008) or reality shows on teen pregnancy (Wright, et 
al., 2012). More closely related to corruption, an experiment conducted by John et al. (2014) among 
students in the US suggests that awareness of widespread dishonest behaviour increases cheating 
while monetary incentives have less of an impact. Similar results were found in an information 
experiment by Corbacho et al. (2016) in Costa Rica. Participants who believed that everyone else 
was corrupt and/or who had had personal experience with corruption in the past were more likely to 
engage in corrupt behaviours themselves. In addition, Denisova-Schmidt et al. (2015) and 
Denisova-Schmidt et al. (2016a) found similarly perverse effects of anti-corruption educational 
campaigns for specific subgroups: students at selected Ukrainian public universities who had not 
previously been involved in monetary corruption or deceiving faculty members learned about the 
extent of this phenomenon from the anti-corruption materials used in the experiment and became 
more tolerant towards corruption. See also the study by Denisova-Schmidt et al. (2017), who found 
that, for students at public universities in the Russian Far East, anti-corruption interventions 
(brochures or cartoons) might increase tolerance towards academic dishonesty among specific 
subgroups (non-plagiarizing students) while promoting negative views on corruption in other 
groups (excellent students and students with well-educated fathers).  
The experiment presented in this paper (a.) considers the effects of three different videos on aspects 
and consequences of corruption (treatment groups) compared to a video on higher education 
(control group) and (b.) is conducted in the context of social media among more than 3,000 online 
survey participants, rather than at university campuses. In contrast to our previous study (Denisova-
Schmidt et. al., 2017), which tested the effects of cartoons showing rats as the main characters2, this 
study used videos with real people as the main characters.  Our findings suggest that videos spread 
via social media might be an appropriate tool to promote awareness about the negative 
consequences of corruption among students, but the way the corruption issue is presented and 
communicated matters for the effectiveness. Specifically, we find that one video, which presented 
the consequences of corruption in a thrilling and accessible way based on telling a personal story 
related to common issues of bribing, promoted negative attitudes towards corruption in several 
dimensions. Online survey participants exposed to this video more often judged corruption to be a 
crime and evil, and to have a negative impact on one’s health, security, the healthcare system and 
                                                 
2 ‘Ten Faces of Corruption’, a cartoon series developed by Transparency International Russia as part of the educational 
project ‘The Alphabet of a Corruption Fighter’. 
Transparency International Russia (2015a). Episode 1: Bribe. YouTube video. https: 
//www.youtube.com/watch?v=zGeworhwEFo, accessed December 2018. 
Transparency International Russia (2015b). Episode 3: Corruption corporate raid. 
YouTube video. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4aTjUyX67xc, accessed December 2018. 
4 
 
the economy of Ukraine. These findings also persisted when applying machine learning methods to 
(a.) account for multiple hypothesis testing issues (i.e. spurious effects), and (b.) control for minor 
covariate imbalances across treatment groups due to attrition or imperfect randomization. The 
remaining two treatment videos presented corruption issues more formally in a way that resembles 
TV news reporting or documentaries, one of which provided statistics and information on 
countermeasures against corruption, while the other discussed the legitimacy of academic cheating 
under certain circumstances. Neither video appeared to negatively affect attitudes towards 
corruption. If anything, they seemed to foster sympathy for the existence of corruption, although the 
comparably few statistically significant effects might be spurious due to multiple hypothesis testing.   
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the research design and the 
data; Section 3 presents the empirical analysis and results. In addition to the experimental treatment 
effects, this section provides an analysis of sample attrition as well as a discussion of machine 
learning-based methods to investigate multiple hypothesis testing issues, tackle imbalances of 
observed covariates across treatment groups and analyse effect heterogeneity across covariates. 
Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Research design and data 
 
The research design and data collection were implemented on our behalf by the sociological 
company FAMA, located in Lviv, Ukraine. A Facebook account, @atlantynespisuyut (Engl.: 
Atlantes do not cheat), was created and regularly updated from October 2016 on. Questions 
regarding academic integrity as well as some current issues in Ukrainian higher education were 
discussed in the Facebook group. In parallel, we assigned the PR agency Tvoe Mesto, also based in 
Lviv, to prepare three videos according to our guidelines showing several typical cases of 
corruption as well as a ‘control’ video that discusses modern means of education but does not touch 
on corruption at all. One video was obtained from the Kyiv-based production studio 315film for 
non-commercial usage. Using Facebook, direct mailings to various student groups and 
announcements on the FAMA homepage, as well as some additional channels, respondents were 
recruited to participate in our survey. A potential respondent was supposed to answer the first part 
of the online survey, consisting of questions about their studies (major, academic year, academic 
achievements), demographics and socioeconomic characteristics as well as on their personal 
experience with and/or witnessing of questionable behaviour related to bribing or unsound methods 
in the education system. Then the students were to watch a video randomly assigned to them and 
afterwards continued with the second part of the survey, which also contained questions related to 
corruption (as in Denisova-Schmidt et al., 2016b), such as whether they viewed corruption in a 
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rather negative (‘evil’ and ‘crime’), pragmatic (‘necessity’, ‘a way of solving problems’), positive 
(‘a way of getting income’ and ‘compensation for low wages’), neutral (‘temporary situation’ and 
‘part of life’) or typically ‘Ukrainian’ (‘tradition’ and ‘national peculiarity) way. Similar to 
Denisova-Schmidt et al., 2017, the respondents were also asked how they perceived the impact of 
corruption on their personal quality of life, education, health and safety, and on the Ukrainian 
economy. At the end of the survey, participants could optionally take part in a lottery to win a small 
monetary prize, which will be analysed in a companion paper. The survey experiment was run 
between May and October 2017.  
Students from more than 550 educational institutions in 128 cities participated in the survey, 
although substantial attrition occurred during question answering (the reasons for which are 
discussed below). Almost all regions of the country were represented, with most students coming 
from (in descending order) Lviv, Kyiv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Ternopil and Dnipro. 99.7% of 
all respondents who indicated the location of their university were Ukrainian students. In some 
cases, the survey was completed by students who, at the time of answering, were studying abroad, 
particularly in Poland, Germany or the United States of America. The majority of the respondents 
were women (83.3%). Most respondents (89.1%) chose the Ukrainian language to complete the 
online application form (the questionnaires were offered in two languages – Ukrainian and 
Russian).  
Over the data collection period, more than 15,000 users visited the website, out of which 9,152 
started answering the survey questions. However, only 3,034 respondents reached the end of the 
survey. The high attrition rate is likely due to the following reasons:  
1) Curiosity, but no willingness to participate in the survey: out of the 15,000 visitors of the site, 
almost six thousand of them did not interact with the questionnaire at all. 1,761 indicated a language 
they were comfortable with, but immediately left the questionnaire tab. 
2) Sensitive questions: many respondents dropped out at the questions on personal experience with 
and/or witnessing questionable behaviour. These include ‘Have you, your friends or relatives ever 
encountered violations (bribes, gifts, help in answering) when taking the ZNO (the External 
Independent Exam)?’ with 339 drop-outs and ‘How often have you heard about situations where 
your friends or relatives solved their problems with a bribe?’ with 272 drop-outs. 
3) The length of the questionnaires: during the pilot phase, we observed the duration required for 
filling out the questionnaire to be in the range of 7 to 27 minutes. A large number of students appear 
to have left the survey prematurely due to fatigue. 
4) Technical problems: thanks to comments from Facebook users, we were informed about several 
issues with video playback in October 2017. Those problems were rapidly solved, but we had 3,017 
survey participants who did not return after watching a video. It is not known how many users 
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returned to the questionnaire after encountering technical problems, and how many dropped out 
because of them. While the latter likely increased attrition rates, this is applicable to all videos; 
therefore, the experimental design based on randomization into various videos was not jeopardized 
by this issue. This is corroborated by similar dropout rates while watching the video across 
treatments that range from 24 to 26.7%, which are not statistically significantly different from each 
other.  
In what follows, we briefly discuss the content of the four exclusively and randomly assigned 
videos. Three of them are treatments in the sense that they aim at creating awareness about the 
consequences of corruption, while the fourth, which is presented to the control group, is on modern 
means of education.  
 
Video 1: ‘He paid’ (duration: 1 minute and 4 seconds)3.  
The video is presented as a story told by a child who is shown only at the end of the movie. The boy 
begins by saying how his mother and father met each other eight years ago: a young man was in a 
rush early in the morning; he was driving a car and breaking the rules in order not to be late for 
work. A transport police officer stopped him, but the young man paid a bribe and was not punished. 
At this occasion, he met a young lady who was also paying a bribe to the same police officer. Later, 
they both became a couple. The policeman had a son, apparently a very lazy boy, who becomes – 
thanks to a bribe − a student at a very prestigious medical university and graduates from it. By this 
time, the couple is expecting a baby and the student is working as a gynaecologist. By accident, 
they all meet in a maternity ward, where the doctor assists the young woman with the delivery. 
Obviously, the doctor made some professional mistakes and the child suffered a birth trauma. 
Finally, the storyteller is shown sitting in a wheelchair: he has cerebral palsy and cannot move or 
talk to his parents. If he were able to talk, he would say to them that, by paying a bribe, they are 
paying with the future of their children. The video is very emotional; it appeals to the prevalence of 
endemic corruption in Ukrainian society by showing a worst-case scenario for corruption in higher 
education: that unqualified people might get positions where they are responsible for their lives of 
others. But the message is much broader: both parents have ‘contributed’ to the disability of their 
child, too, even if indirectly.  
 
Video 2: ‘About corruption’ (duration: 1 minute and 14 seconds).  
A young lady, a journalist, is making some statements on the recent anti-corruption developments in 
the country after the Euromaidan 2014 protest movement. She refers to the data provided by the 
                                                 
3 The rights holder (315film) granted us permission for the non-commercial use of the video.   
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Ukrainian subchapter of Transparency International, an NGO working on corruption worldwide, 
and cites data from other sociological institutions and the American Chamber of Commerce. The 
video is much closer to a typical analysis made by TV news channels, with the pragmatic 
representation of information, some observations and actual statistics. The main message is that, 
while corruption exists, many countermeasures and remedies have been taken in the country and 
progress is visible.  
 
Video 3: ‘Essays on Ecology’ (duration: 1 minute and 38 seconds).  
The focus of this video is on a young lady, a full-time student in her fourth year majoring in 
economics. She says that she is now preparing an academic paper for a class on ecology, a 
discipline that is not part of her core studies. She is going to download a paper for this class from 
the Internet and submit it as her own. Her justification goes beyond the usual ‘unnecessary classes’ 
defence: she thinks that nobody will actually read this assignment. Moreover, she already works in 
her field. She says, however, that in her initial academic years, she attended all the lectures and 
completed all the homework assignments, but at one point she realized that there were other tools to 
do homework, especially for what she calls ‘bulimia learning’. The video focuses on the legitimacy 
of academic cheating under certain circumstances.   
 
Video 4: ‘Modern Education’ (duration: 1 minute) (control video). 
The video shows young people – students – working on computers in multimedia rooms and sitting 
in university auditoriums listening to an apparently fascinating presentation. A young lady describes 
how innovative the current higher education system is, how much it has to offer and how important 
it is for the lives of young people.  
 
Our final evaluation sample is comprised of 3,196 respondents (see also the discussion in Section 
3), for some of whom item non-responses occur for a subset of variables. While all of the oblasts of 
Ukraine are represented, the majority of the respondents were located the Lviv region (26.5%), 
Kyiv region (20.1%), Dnipro region (6%), Kharkiv region (5.6) and Ivano-Frankivsk region (5.2%). 
Most lived in urban areas (77.4%) while 22.2% indicated that they reside in villages and small 
settlements. Humanities (31.5%), social sciences (26.1%) and technical subjects (24.7%) were the 
dominant fields of studies, in contrast to natural (7.6%) and medical (9.0%) sciences. 73.3% of 
respondents studied in a publicly financed program, while 26.4% paid private tuition fees. 18% of 
respondents were in the first year, 18.8% in the second, 23.2% in the third and 21.3% in the fourth 
year of their bachelor’s program. 17.6% were enrolled in a master’s program. 94.7% of respondents 
were born between 1994 and 2000, i.e. they were 17 to 24 years old at the time of the survey. 
8 
 
Interestingly, and somewhat surprisingly, 82% of the respondents were female. While it is common 
to have a higher percentage of female response rates in surveys (Moore & Tarnai 2002; Singer et al 
2000; Smith 2008), the gender difference in participation in our study is likely driven to some 
extent by the higher share of female students in Ukrainian universities overall and imbalances in 
enrolment across various fields. Kogut (2014) points out that 52.3% of all students at Ukrainian 
universities in the 2013-14 academic year were women, making up 79% in humanities, 77% in 
social sciences, 74% in medicine, 62% in natural sciences, but only 22% in technical studies.  
39.3% of respondents indicated that they live in a student dorm, while 17.5% rent accommodations 
and the rest live with their parents or in an owned home. 39.5% worked part-time for an average of 
6.2 hours per day. Only 3.8% had studied abroad. Interestingly, 21.3% claimed their most common 
grades to be ‘excellent’, 44.2% between ‘good’ and ‘excellent’, 14.6% ‘good’, 16.7% between 
‘satisfactory’ and ‘good’ and only 2.9% to be ‘satisfactory’. 31.2% of the respondents mentioned 
‘getting a good education’ as their main motivation for obtaining a university degree, while 51.1% 
mentioned ‘getting a good job’. Other reasons included ‘to get a university diploma’ (10%), ‘to 
please parents’ (2.3%) and ‘because everyone does so’ (1.6%). An almost equal number of 
respondents reported a daily preparatory time of more than 3 hours (31%), 2-3 hours (26.9%), or 1-
2 hours (26.8%). 12.2% indicated less than one hour per day. Table 1 provides detailed 
demographic, social and educational characteristics of the respondents. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
 Non-missing 
observations 
 Number of cases % of 
observations 
Gender 3148 male 526 16.71% 
  female 2622 83.29% 
Language  3196 Ukrainian  2848 89.11% 
  Russian 348 10.89% 
Form of education 3186 state stipend 2342 73.51% 
  own costs 844 26.49% 
Field of study 3186 humanities 1007 31.61% 
  social sciences 833 26.15% 
  technical studies  791 24.83% 
  natural sciences 243 7.63% 
  medical science 287 9.01% 
  sports sciences 25 0.78% 
Study year  3186 first 576 18.08% 
  second  600 18.83% 
  third 741 23.26% 
  forth  680 21.34% 
  fifth 384 12.05% 
  sixth  180 5.65% 
  internship 9 0.28% 
  postgraduate  16 0.50% 
Study mode  3186 full-time student 3044 95.54% 
  part-time student  138 4.33% 
  external student  4 0.13% 
Year of birth 3143 before 1996 683 21.73% 
  1996 527 16.77% 
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  1997 542 17.24% 
  1998 589 18.74% 
  after 1998 802 25.52% 
Place of origin 3149 city, more than 1 mln 
pop 
571 18.13% 
  city, 0.5 to 1 mln pop 425 13.50% 
  city, 0.25 to 0.5 mln 
pop 
468 14.86% 
  city, 0.05 to 0.25 mln 
pop 
449 14.26% 
  city, 0.02 to 0.05 mln 
pop 
278 8.83% 
  city, 0.002 to 0.02 
mln pop 
257 8.16% 
  small city 218 6.92% 
  village 483 15.34% 
What are the most frequent 
marks you get at the 
university? 
3187 satisfactory 93 2.92% 
 between satisfactory 
and good 
534 16.75% 
  good 466 14.62% 
  between good and 
excellent 
1414 44.37% 
  excellent 680 21.34% 
How many hours per day do 
you spend for self-
study/homework/preparation 
to classes? 
3186 none 90 2.82% 
 less than 1 hour 389 12.21% 
 1-2 hours 856 26.87% 
  2-3 hours 860 27.00% 
  more than 3 hours 991 31.10% 
Income status of the family 3021 enough for food only  215 7.12% 
  enough for food and 
closing 
347 11.49% 
  not enough for 
durable goods 
1229 38.29% 
  enough for durable 
goods 
1069 35.38% 
  enough for 
everything 
616 20.39% 
Where do you live? 3016 dormitory 1192 39.52% 
  with parents/relatives 1177 39.02% 
  rent a flat 531 17.61% 
  own flat/without 
parents 
116 3.85% 
Did you take the External 
Independent Evaluation 
before entering? 
3196 yes 2750 86.05% 
 no 446 13.95% 
Do you combine your study 
with job?  
3007 do not work 1809 60.16% 
  work and study  1198 39.84% 
Study abroad 2998 yes 115 3.84% 
  no 2883 96.16% 
Reasons to get higher 
education  
3187 good education 998 31.31% 
 good job 1632 51.21% 
 diploma 321 10.07% 
  parents 72 2.26% 
  everyone does it  50 1.57% 
  other  114 3.58% 
 
53.5% indicated that they had never encountered bribery at a university (with only 9.3% claiming 
that they had not even heard that bribes were accepted at universities), while 19% have encountered 
it rarely, 13.4% sometimes, 7.6% often and 3.6% reported to see it constantly. Concerning non-
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monetary fraudulent practices, only 16.4% stated that they never use cheat sheets during exams, 
51.4% never submit ready-made course papers downloaded from the Internet as their own and 
79.8% never purchase course papers from others. At the same time, only 14.8% indicated that they 
never copy and paste parts of course papers from the Internet and 13.6% never cheat during tests or 
exams. Roughly half (49.8%) claimed to have never tried to lie to a teacher when explaining 
learning-related issues, while 76.3% have never asked a faculty member for preferential treatment. 
These findings are comparable to the results obtained by the authors in a face-to-face survey of 600 
students from Lviv in 2015 (Denisova-Schmidt et al., 2015 and 2016). Table 2 presents the 
respondents’ experiences with corruption and fraudulent behaviour in secondary school, during the 
university entrance process and in university, while table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the 
outcome variables.  
 
Table 2. Respondents’ experience with corruption 
Questions Non-missing 
observations 
Categories 
 
Yes, I 
personally 
Yes, my 
friends/ 
(relatives) No, nobody 
  
Have you, your friends or relatives ever encountered 
violations (situations in admissions commissions, in granting 
privileges and allocation of quotas, etc.) when entering the 
university? 
 
 
3172 265 
8.35% 
709 
22.35% 
2198 
69.29%   
   
never rarely sometimes. often missing 
 
If you or your parents ever gave presents to teachers at school 
(candies, books, computer equipment, etc.), or, for example, 
paid for voluntary-compulsory tutoring classes with school 
teachers, how often did it happen? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3252 991 
30.47% 
880 
27.06% 
832 
25.58% 
406 
12.48% 
143 
4.40% 
 
Have you ever heard that bribes are taken or given in the 
higher education institution? 
 
 
3172 
296 
9.33% 
395 
12.45% 
799 
25.19% 
981 
30.93% 
701 
22.10
% 
Have you ever heard of the situations when your friends or 
relatives solved their problems by pulling strings? 
 
 
3172 438 13.81% 
675 
21.28% 
1115 
35.15% 
723 
22.79% 
221 
6.97% 
How often have you heard about cases when your friends or 
relatives solve their problems by bribe? 
 
 
3172 380 11.98% 
755 
23.80% 
1010 
31.84% 
812 
25.60% 
215 
6.78% 
How often do you use the following practices: 
 
  
Use cheat sheets at exams 3100 525 
16.94% 
951 
30.68% 
916 
29.55% 
525 
16.94% 
183 
5.90% 
Submit papers downloaded from the Internet 3100 1642 
52.97% 
798 
25.74% 
427 
13.77% 
186 
6.00% 
47 
1.52% 
Buy papers 3100 2550 
82.26% 
293 
9.45% 
160 
5.16% 
72 
2.32% 
25 
0.81% 
Write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the Internet 3100 474 
15.29% 
785 
25.32% 
819 
26.42% 
729 
23.52% 
293 
9.45% 
Copy off during exams or tests 3100 435 
14.03% 
1037 
33.45% 
907 
29.26% 
544 
17.55% 
177 
5.71% 
Deceive professors about study problems 3100 1592 
51.35% 
872 
28.13% 
428 
13.81% 
155 
5.00% 
53 
1.71% 
Ask professors for preferential treatment 3100 2437 
75.71% 
427 
13.77% 
180 
5.81% 
45 
1.45% 
11 
0.35% 
Have you ever personally encountered bribery at a university? 3100 1709 
55.13% 
606 
19.55% 
428 
13.81% 
243 
7.84% 
114 
3.68% 
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Our data suggest that students consider corruption to be a predominantly negative phenomenon: 
84.83% judged corruption to be something rather ‘evil’ (answering either ‘rather so’ or ‘definitely 
so’; see table 3) and 87.96% to be a ‘crime’. A large share also saw corruption to be typically 
‘Ukrainian’ (a ‘tradition’, 43.78%, and a ‘national peculiarity, 31.32%), considered it ‘a way of 
getting income’ (31.69%) or a ‘compensation for low wages’ (35.32%), a ‘temporary situation’ 
(14.39%) and a ‘part of life’ (14.95%). Taking a pragmatic stand, 2.44% found it to be a ‘necessity’ 
and 31.04% ‘a way of solving problems’. Academic dishonesty is widespread among young people. 
The most common cheating techniques were crib cheats: 95.08% reported using them ‘sometimes’, 
‘often’ or ‘all the time’; see table 3. 93.15% engaged in other types of cheating during exams and 
tests, and 92.21% wrote term papers by copying and pasting from the Internet without 
acknowledging the sources. 84.76% reported that they ‘outsource’ their homework to other 
individuals and organizations, 89.83% have downloaded papers and submit them as their own. 
83.32% have given misleading excuses for poor academic performance to faculty members, 59.82% 
to ask for preferential treatment. At the same time, the majority of respondents were concerned that 
corruption had a rather negative impact on their own career perspectives: 83.89% found it to be 
‘strictly negative’ or ‘rather negative’. A large share also thought corruption negatively affects their 
own quality of life (84.98%), their own education (88.95%), their own health (78.44%) and their 
own security (85.70%), as well as more broadly the economy (97.27%), politics (97.93%), 
education (98.50%), medicine (96.28%) and the police (98.19%) in Ukraine.  
 
Table 3. Respondents’ attitudes/opinions toward corruption after the treatment 
 Non-
missing 
obs. 
Categories 
What does corruption mean to you?   
definitely no rather no yes and no rather so definitely so 
necessity 3196 2033 
63.61% 
751 
23.50% 
334 
10.45% 
64 
2.00% 
14 
0.44% 
means of income 3196 1173 
36.70% 
383 
11.98% 
627 
19.62% 
678 
21.21% 
335 
10.48% 
crime 3196 35 
1.09% 
41 
1.28% 
309 
9.67% 
711 
22.25% 
2100 
65.71% 
part of life 3196 1443 
45.15% 
627 
19.62% 
648 
20.28% 
367 
11.48% 
111 
3.47% 
means to solve problems 3196 739 
23.12% 
476 
14.89% 
989 
30.94% 
746 
23.34% 
246 
7.70% 
compensation for low salaries 3196 797 
24.94% 
457 
14.30% 
813 
25.44% 
784 
24.53% 
345 
10.79% 
temporary situation 3196 944 
29.54% 
967 
30.26% 
825 
25.81% 
381 
11.92% 
79 
2.47% 
tradition 3196 691 
21.62% 
460 
14.39% 
646 
20.21% 
1007 
31.51% 
392 
12.27% 
national peculiarity 3196 945 
29.57% 
593 
18.55% 
657 
20.56% 
739 
23.12% 
262 
8.20% 
evil 3196 31 
0.97% 
94 
2.94% 
360 
11.26% 
649 
20.31% 
2062 
64.52% 
How often do you think students use the following 
practices? 
  
never rarely sometimes often all the time 
Use cheat sheets at exams 3196 23 
0.72% 
160 
5.01% 
465 
14.55% 
1639 
51.28% 
909 
28.44% 
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Submit papers downloaded from the Internet 3196 68 
2.13% 
257 
8.04% 
677 
21.18% 
1611 
50.41% 
583 
18.24% 
Buy papers 3196 108 
3.38% 
379 
11.86% 
951 
29.75% 
1395 
43.65% 
363 
11.36% 
Write papers plagiarizing some chapters from the Internet 3196 36 
1.13% 
213 
6.66% 
559 
17.49% 
1438 
44.99% 
950 
29.72% 
Copy off during exams or tests 3196 38 
1.19% 
181 
5.66% 
612 
19.15% 
1555 
48.65% 
810 
25.34% 
Deceive professors about study problems 3196 99 
3.10% 
434 
13.58% 
1064 
32.73% 
1232 
38.55% 
367 
11.48% 
Ask professors for preferential treatment 3196 325 
10.17% 
959 
30.01% 
1156 
36.17% 
597 
18.68% 
159 
4.97% 
In your view, how does corruption affect…:    strictly 
negatively 
rather 
negatively 
rather 
positively 
fully 
positively 
  
your career opportunities 3196 1068 
33.42% 
1613 
50.47% 
434 
13.58% 
81 
2.53% 
  
your quality of life 3196 1249 
39.08% 
1467 
45.90% 
395 
12.36% 
85 
2.66% 
  
your education 3196 1645 
51.47% 
1198 
37.48% 
284 
8.89% 
69 
2.16% 
  
your health 3196 1124 
35.17% 
1383 
43.27% 
533 
16.68% 
156 
4.88% 
  
your safety 3196 1369 
42.83% 
1370 
42.87% 
369 
11.55% 
88 
2.75% 
  
Ukrainian economy  3196 2457 
76.88% 
652 
20.40% 
62 
1.94% 
25 
0.78% 
  
Ukrainian politics 3196 2668 
83.48% 
462 
14.45% 
38 
1.19% 
28 
0.88% 
  
Ukrainian education 3196 2670 
83.54% 
478 
14.96% 
30 
0.94% 
18 
0.56% 
  
Ukrainian health system 3196 2626 
82.17% 
451 
14.11% 
92 
2.88% 
27 
0.84% 
  
Ukrainian police 3196 2820 
88.24% 
318 
9.95% 
34 
1.06% 
24 
0.75% 
  
 
 
3. Empirical analysis and results 
 
As has already been mentioned, our initial sample was prone to large attrition rates. Out of the 
9,152 participants who started the online survey, 2,751 dropped out of the study prior to treatment 
assignment for the potential reasons given above. Therefore, the treatment was randomly assigned 
to the remaining 6,401 individuals. However, attrition or item non-response was also substantial 
after treatment randomization, when measuring the outcome variables: for only 3,196, or roughly 
half of the observations who were assigned a treatment, all outcomes are observed, while for 3,205 
observations at least one outcome is missing. Such post-assignment attrition jeopardizes the 
consistency of the experimental evaluation of treatment effects if it is jointly influenced by the 
treatment and background characteristics that also affect the outcomes. This issue is known as 
Heckman-type sample selection (see for instance Heckman, 1979) in economics or collider bias in 
statistics.  
Figure 1: Treatment frequencies among observations with observed outcomes 
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Note: 0 is control, 1 is treatment ‘he paid’, 2 ‘about corruption’. 3 ‘essays on ecology’.  
 
To investigate whether attrition is selective with regard to the treatment, Figure 1 displays the 
frequencies of treatments among observations for whom all outcomes are observed. The treatment 
distribution appears to roughly follow a uniform distribution as expected under random assignment 
with constant treatment probabilities. In fact, the p-value of a chi2 test on differences in the 
frequencies is 0.393, such that the uniform distribution cannot be rejected at any conventional level 
of significance in the sample without missing outcomes. As a second check for the selectivity of 
attrition, we create a binary indicator, which is 1 if at least one outcome is missing and 0 if all 
outcomes are observed and regress it on the treatment dummies. Table 4 presents the results. We do 
not find a statistically significant effect of the first video (‘He paid’) on attrition when compared to 
the control group, such that attrition appears to be random with regard to. the first treatment. Videos 
2 and 3, however, statistically significantly (at the 5% level) reduce attrition by roughly 4% points, 
which may cause selectivity bias if attrition induces background characteristics to be imbalanced 
across treatments.  
 
Table 4: Treatment effects on attrition and nonresponse 
 est  
 
se pval 
constant (average attrition for control group with education treatment) 0.52 0.01 0.00 
treatment he paid -0.01 0.02 0.72 
treatment about corruption -0.04 0.02 0.04 
treatment ecology -0.04 0.02 0.02 
Note: OLS regression with binary attrition indicator as dependent variable. ‘est’, ‘se’ and ‘pval’ report the coefficients, 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors and p-values, respectively.  
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Table 5 therefore presents balance tests that compare the means of observed covariates across 
different treatments in the absence of attrition. It thus allows the investigation of selectivity with 
regard to observed covariates by checking whether the treatments are (still) balanced when 
considering only cases with non-missing values in the outcomes and covariates. If this is the case 
and the covariates either include or behave (in terms of attrition) like the background characteristics 
affecting the outcome, then the effects of the treatments are consistently estimated for sample 
without attrition – i.e. they are internally valid (see the discussion in Huber, 2012). We use two 
sample t-tests for pairwise comparisons of the covariate means of each treatment with the control 
group and find that only few variables are statistically significantly different at the 5% level: 
Studying humanities is significant for all treatments, studying natural science is significant for the 
third video (ecology), while studying as full-time students, studying for a good education, and 
cheating during exams are significant for the second video (about corruption). Given the large 
amount of covariate-treatment combinations tested, the few statistically significant differences do 
not point to important covariate imbalances after attrition.  
 
Table 5: Covariate balance across treatments 
  he paid on corruption ecology 
 
 mcontr mtreat diff pval mtreat diff pval mtreat diff pval 
male 0.16 0.15 -0.01 0.55 0.18 0.02 0.33 0.18 0.02 0.21 
 
Ukrainian language 0.90 0.90 0.01 0.63 0.90 0.00 0.83 0.92 0.03 0.08 
 
is abroad 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.59 0.00 -0.00 0.32 
 
humanities 0.36 0.31 -0.05 0.04 0.31 -0.05 0.04 0.30 -0.06 0.01 
 
social sciences 0.25 0.26 0.01 0.54 0.26 0.01 0.71 0.28 0.03 0.21 
 
technical studies 0.22 0.25 0.03 0.20 0.26 0.03 0.17 0.24 0.02 0.47 
 
natural sciences 0.06 0.08 0.02 0.18 0.08 0.02 0.17 0.09 0.03 0.05 
 
medical studies 0.09 0.09 -0.00 0.81 0.09 0.00 0.94 0.09 -0.00 0.80 
 
sports science 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.17 0.01 -0.01 0.14 0.01 -0.00 0.52 
 
state financed 0.72 0.75 0.03 0.22 0.74 0.02 0.38 0.73 0.01 0.61 
 
full-time students 0.97 0.96 -0.01 0.17 0.94 -0.03 0.00 0.96 -0.01 0.40 
 
study year 3.08 3.18 0.10 0.18 3.15 0.07 0.34 3.04 -0.04 0.61 
 
grades 3.66 3.69 0.02 0.65 3.62 -0.04 0.43 3.66 0.00 0.95 
 
time to prepare 3.73 3.71 -0.03 0.65 3.68 -0.04 0.47 3.72 -0.00 0.95 
 
had entrance test 0.87 0.85 -0.02 0.38 0.88 0.01 0.68 0.86 -0.01 0.58 
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studying for good education 0.34 0.31 -0.03 0.17 0.29 -0.05 0.03 0.32 -0.02 0.47 
 
studying for diploma 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.70 0.09 -0.01 0.65 0.10 0.00 0.96 
 
studying because of parents 0.02 0.02 -0.00 0.74 0.02 0.00 0.98 0.02 -0.00 0.58 
 
studying because all do 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.67 0.01 -0.00 0.75 0.02 0.00 0.81 
 
bribes: personal experience 0.06 0.06 0.00 0.72 0.07 0.02 0.23 0.05 -0.00 0.73 
 
bribes: friends 0.14 0.15 0.01 0.43 0.15 0.01 0.47 0.16 0.02 0.32 
 
bribes: no experience 0.67 0.65 -0.02 0.42 0.67 -0.00 0.93 0.66 -0.01 0.65 
 
presents to teacher 2.40 2.34 -0.06 0.33 2.37 -0.03 0.63 2.38 -0.01 0.83 
 
violations in uni: pers. 0.07 0.08 0.01 0.35 0.09 0.02 0.08 0.08 0.02 0.18 
 
viol. in uni: friends 0.23 0.25 0.02 0.46 0.20 -0.03 0.21 0.21 -0.02 0.42 
 
viol. in uni: no one 0.71 0.68 -0.03 0.22 0.71 0.00 0.91 0.70 -0.00 0.97 
 
heard: bribes in uni 3.43 3.46 0.03 0.63 3.46 0.03 0.68 3.38 -0.05 0.39 
 
heard: pulling strings 2.90 2.89 -0.01 0.86 2.88 -0.03 0.65 2.84 -0.06 0.28 
 
uses cheat sheets 2.66 2.65 -0.01 0.89 2.69 0.04 0.52 2.58 -0.07 0.21 
 
downloads papers etc. 1.80 1.78 -0.02 0.68 1.78 -0.02 0.66 1.75 -0.06 0.27 
 
buys papers etc. 1.31 1.30 -0.01 0.75 1.26 -0.05 0.18 1.32 0.01 0.78 
 
copies parts 2.83 2.88 0.05 0.40 2.94 0.11 0.07 2.83 -0.00 0.99 
 
cheats during exams 2.63 2.70 0.07 0.23 2.75 0.13 0.03 2.63 -0.00 0.97 
 
lies to teacher 1.77 1.74 -0.03 0.52 1.79 0.01 0.82 1.81 0.03 0.49 
 
asks for special treatment 1.30 1.35 0.05 0.20 1.29 -0.02 0.58 1.32 0.01 0.82 
 
encountered bribery at uni 1.83 1.83 -0.01 0.93 1.92 0.08 0.18 1.83 -0.01 0.93 
 
Note: ‘mcontr’: mean of control group (education treatment); ‘mtreat’: mean of respective treatment; ‘diff’: mean 
difference; ‘pval’: p-value of mean difference based on a two sampe t-test allowing for heteroscedasticity. Regional 
dummies are omitted. 
 
Our findings about nonselective attrition are also corroborated when using a machine learning-
based test to investigate the joint balance of all covariates together, separately for each treatment-
control comparison. To this end, we apply an approach suggested by Ludwig, Mullainathan, and 
Spiess (2017). It is based on the intuition that the problem of obtaining too many significant 
differences when testing multiple hypotheses (e.g. differences in multiple covariates across 
treatments), or false positives, is similar to the concern of overfitting in machine learning, or 
including too many regressors when predicting a variable. In our case, the question is whether the 
treatment can be predicted by the covariates, which would point to imbalances.  
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We thus follow Ludwig et al (2017), who propose applying the machine learning logic to the 
context of multiple testing, and split our data into training and testing data. In the training data, we 
run a lasso logit regression of the respective treatment (vs. control) on the covariates using the 
‘rlogit’ command with its default values in the ‘hdm’ package by Chernozhukov, Hansen, and 
Spindler (2015) for the statistical software ‘R’.  We then use the obtained coefficients for predicting 
the treatment in the test data and compare the prediction to the actual treatment to compute the 
mean squared error. We use 5-fold cross-validation, such that the roles of training and test data are 
swapped, and take the average of the 5 mean squared errors obtained (in order to reduce its 
variance). In a next step, we randomly relabel (or permute) the treatment variables and re-estimate 
the MSE using the same procedure; see Ludwig et al (2017). Repeating the permutation 999 times, 
we compute the p-value for the joint significance of the covariates as the share of permutation based 
MSEs that are lower than the MSE with the correct coding of the treatment. The permutation test’s 
intuition is that if the covariates are balanced across treatments, relabelling the latter will not 
seriously affect (i.e. increase) the MSE. If, on the other hand, covariates are predictive for the 
treatment, then the correct coding of the treatment should entail a smaller MSE than the permuted 
versions.  
The first line in Table 6 provides the results of the machine learning-based test for assessing the 
joint balance of all covariates separately for each treatment-control comparison. For the first and 
third video, the null hypothesis is not rejected at any conventional level of significance (with p-
values of 53 and 37%, respectively), while for the second video, the differences in covariates are 
marginally significant at the 10%, but not at the 5% level. Finally, a joint test over all treatments, 
which is obtained by arranging the four treatments into two groups (first and second video vs. third 
video and control group), yields again a p-value far beyond any conventional level of significance. 
Our overall conclusion thus is that despite substantial outcome attrition, covariates are decently 
balanced across treatment states such that causal inference is likely internally valid for the 
observations among which the treatments were randomized. 
 
Table 6: P-values of machine learning-based tests 
 paid corruption ecology paid/corruption vs. 
ecology/education(control) 
 
covariates 0.53 0.37 0.10 0.97 
 
outcomes 0.00 0.52 0.92 0.00 
 
Note: ‘covariates’: provides the p-values of machine learning-based tests (following Ludwig et al, 2017) of joint 
covariate associations with the respective treatment; ‘outcomes’: provides the p-values of machine learning-based tests 
of joint outcome associations with the respective treatment. 
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We subsequently analyse the effects of the various treatments on the outcomes of interest. Due to 
the large amount of outcome variables considered, we are confronted with similar multiple 
hypothesis testing issues as previously discussed for checking covariate balance. To jointly test 
whether some treatment (compared to the control group) has an effect on any of the outcomes 
considered, we again apply the machine learning-based test of Ludwig et al (2017) outlined above. 
However, the causal order of the treatment and outcomes is reversed in the lasso regression: it is the 
treatment that is regressed on all outcome variables, rather than the other way around. The intuition 
is that if the treatment affects some of the outcomes considered, then some of the lasso coefficients 
are non-negligibly different from zero and the MSE with the original labelling of the treatment is 
again likely lower than under permuted treatment labels. The second line of Table 6 presents the 
testing results for pairwise comparisons of each treatment with the control group. We find that the 
first video (‘He paid’) statistically significantly affects the outcome variables with a p-value that is 
essentially zero. In contrast, the p-values for the second and third video are beyond any 
conventional level of significance such that the null that these videos do not affect the outcomes 
cannot be rejected. Finally, when running a joint test for all treatments by grouping them into two 
categories (first and second video vs. third video and control group), we obtain again a p-value 
close to zero. This indicates that the treatments jointly affect the joint distribution of the outcomes, 
but this effect appears to be entirely driven by the first video.   
Table 7 provides the experimental treatment effect estimates separately for each of the outcomes 
based on two sample t-tests of mean differences between the respective treatment and control 
groups. We find that the first video (‘He paid’) statistically significantly modifies several attitudes 
towards corruption: the treated more often believe that corruption is a ‘crime’ and ‘evil’ (significant 
at the 5% and 1% levels, respectively), has a negative impact on one’s health, security, the health 
care system (all significant at the 1% level), and the economy of Ukraine (significant at the 10% 
level). Furthermore, those exposed to the first video report less often that corruption is a ‘means to 
earn money’ (significant at the 1% level) and believe more often that corruption is a ‘compensation 
for low salaries’ (significant at the 10% level). Hence, this video has the largest impact among any 
intervention and induces a more negative view of corruption overall.  
The second video (‘About corruption’) shows some individual effects especially on attitudes 
towards corruption, although we acknowledge that they could be spurious due to multiple testing 
(as the joint test on all outcomes presented above was not statistically significant). Individuals 
exposed to the video more often reported that corruption is ‘a necessity’ and ‘a way of solving 
problems’ (significant at the 1% level), ‘a compensation for low salaries’ (significant at the 5% 
level), ‘a part of life’ and ‘a temporary phenomenon’ (significant at the 10% level) and also that it 
has a generally positive influence on education in Ukrainian (significant at the 10% level). The 
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treatment also decreases the view that corruption is a ‘national peculiarity’ (significant at the 5% 
level). Taken at face value, the results for the second video bear similarities with those obtained in 
Denisova-Schmidt et al. (2015, 2016) and Corbacho et al. (2016), where an exposure to information 
on the spread of corruption had a promoting effect (i.e. ‘corruption corrupts’).  
For the third video, ‘Essays on Ecology’, we find only a handful of significant effects, namely 
negative impacts on the view that corruption is ‘a crime’ and ‘evil’ (significant at the 5% level) and 
positive impacts on the judgement that corruption is ‘a necessity’ (significant at the 10% level) and 
on the health conditions of respondents. However, these comparably few effects are likely spurious 
and due to the large number of hypotheses tested, which is supported by the fact that the joint 
significance test presented in Table 6 yields a p-value close to one.   
 
Table 7: Treatment effects (mean differences) 
  he paid on corruption ecology 
 
 mcontr est se pval est se pval est se pval 
corruption is a necessity 1.49 -0.03 0.04 0.51 0.14 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.07 
 
...is a means to earn money 2.59 -0.21 0.07 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.56 0.11 0.07 0.13 
 
...is a crime 4.50 0.09 0.04 0.03 -0.04 0.04 0.33 -0.09 0.04 0.03 
 
...is a part of life 2.04 0.05 0.06 0.40 0.11 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.49 
 
...way of solving problems 2.72 -0.05 0.06 0.43 0.16 0.06 0.01 0.09 0.06 0.15 
 
...compensation for low 
salaries 
2.75 0.12 0.07 0.07 0.15 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.63 
 
...temporary phenomenon 2.26 -0.03 0.05 0.63 0.09 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.05 0.53 
 
...tradition 2.99 -0.02 0.07 0.75 -0.05 0.07 0.45 0.01 0.07 0.94 
 
...national peculiarity 2.65 0.01 0.07 0.86 -0.13 0.07 0.05 -0.03 0.07 0.61 
 
... evil 4.43 0.16 0.04 0.00 -0.00 0.04 0.94 -0.11 0.05 0.02 
 
...influences my career 1.82 0.05 0.04 0.20 0.03 0.04 0.39 0.06 0.04 0.12 
 
...my quality of life 1.77 0.01 0.04 0.83 0.03 0.04 0.43 0.05 0.04 0.21 
 
...my education 1.61 -0.03 0.04 0.41 0.02 0.04 0.56 0.05 0.04 0.17 
 
...my health 1.92 -0.15 0.04 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.68 0.10 0.04 0.01 
 
...my security 1.78 -0.13 0.04 0.00 -0.04 0.04 0.32 0.02 0.04 0.54 
 
...influences Ukrainian 
economy 
1.28 -0.04 0.03 0.08 -0.01 0.03 0.73 0.01 0.03 0.57 
 
...Ukrainian politics 1.18 -0.01 0.02 0.67 0.02 0.02 0.40 0.04 0.02 0.11 
 
...Ukrainian education 1.17 0.01 0.02 0.56 0.04 0.02 0.09 0.02 0.02 0.46 
 
health care system in Ukraine 1.24 -0.08 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.43 -0.01 0.03 0.61 
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...Ukrainian law-enforcement 
system 
1.13 -0.00 0.02 1.00 0.01 0.02 0.59 0.03 0.02 0.23 
 
Note: ‘mcontr’: mean of control group (education treatment); ‘est’: estimated effect (mean difference); ‘se’: 
heteroscedasticity robust standard error; ‘pval’: p-value of the effect. 
 
As a robustness check, Table A1 of the appendix presents the effect estimates when controlling for 
differences in covariates across treatment and control groups in a data driven way. To this end, we 
apply the machine learning approach implemented in the ‘lassoATE’ command (with default 
values) in the ‘hdm’ package by Chernozhukov, Hansen and Spindler (2015) for the statistical 
software ‘R’. This procedure selects all the covariates either importantly affecting the treatment or 
the respective dependent variable by (double) lasso regression and uses them as control variables 
when estimating average treatment effects. Due to the a priori decent covariate balance in our 
evaluation sample (see Tables 5 and 6), the results obtained by this approach are almost identical to 
the mean differences presented in Table 7. 
Finally, we investigate whether effects are heterogeneous across specific background characteristics 
for two negatively loaded outcomes, namely ‘corruption is a crime’ and ‘corruption is evil’. The 
background characteristics of interest include gender, study program, program state financed, study 
year, grades, time to prepare, entrance test and reasons for studying, as well as questions concerning 
experience with bribery and cheating asked prior to treatment assignment. We again use a machine 
learning approach to analyse effect heterogeneity: We split our evaluation data into a training 
sample corresponding to 75% of the observations and a test sample (25%). In the training data, we 
train a random forest for evaluating conditional (rather than average) treatment effects given the 
observed background characteristics using the ‘causal_forest’ command (with default values) of the 
‘grf’ package by Tibshirani, Athey, Wager, Friedberg, Miner and Wright (2018). For each 
observation in the test data, we predict the conditional treatment effects and use the latter as 
outcomes in a lasso regression on the background characteristics based on the ‘rlasso’ command in 
the ‘hdm’ package. This allows finding the best predictors of the conditional treatment effects and 
thus the drivers of effect heterogeneity (if any) across individuals. Table 8 reports the (so-called 
post-lasso) OLS coefficients when regressing the conditional treatment effects on the lasso-selected 
background characteristics in the test data, separately for each video-control comparison. We note 
that only coefficients with an absolute value larger than or equal to 0.01 (or 1% point) are reported. 
According to this analysis, we find that, in general, personal cheating and bribing behaviour, the 
field of studies and the study year are the relatively most important predictors of heterogeneity for 
the various treatments. However, in absolute terms, the magnitude of effect heterogeneity is often 
limited.  
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Table 8: Effect heterogeneity analysis 
he paid on corruption ecology 
 
outcome ‘corruption is crime’ 
 
lies to teacher 0.01 technical studies 0.02 humanities 0.02 
 
copies parts 0.01 uses cheat sheets -0.01 copies parts 0.01 
 
  downloads 
papers etc. 
-0.01 uses cheat sheets 0.01 
 
    buys papers etc. -0.01 
 
outcome ‘corruption is evil’ 
 
bribes: personal 
experience 
0.03 violations in uni: 
pers. 
0.02 bribes: personal 
experience 
0.08 
 
copies parts 0.02 study year 0.02 technical studies 0.04 
 
study year 0.01 medical studies 0.02 copies parts 0.02 
 
  uses cheat sheets -0.01 lies to teacher -0.01 
 
  heard: pulling 
strings 
-0.01 study year 0.01 
 
Note: Post-lasso coefficients when regressing random forest-based predictions of treatment effects on covariates. Only 
(rounded) coefficients that are in absolute terms larger than or equal to 0.01 are included. 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
This paper considers academic dishonesty and corruption based on an online survey among 
Ukrainian students. We conducted an online experiment examining the effects of educational anti-
corruption interventions by randomizing three different videos on corruption and its consequences 
(treatment groups) as well as one video on higher education, but not related to corruption (control 
group) among survey participants. Our data point to substantial academic dishonesty among 
students in Ukraine: about 90% of respondents were involved, to differing extents, in various types 
of cheating, plagiarism and other forms of academic misconduct. At same time, a majority judged 
corruption to negatively affect the economy, politics, education, health and the police in Ukraine. 
Furthermore, many perceived corruption to be an impediment for their own career opportunities, 
quality of life, education, health and safety. For many respondents, corruption seems to be an 
ambivalent phenomenon: most students considered corruption to be a ‘crime’ and ‘evil’, but also ‘a 
tradition’, ‘a way of solving problems’ and ‘a compensation for low salaries’.  
Concerning our experimental interventions, we found that one out of the three videos on corruption 
promoted a more negative attitude towards corruption when compared to the control group. The 
video showed (a.) how a student who obtained a medical degree through bribes and other fraudulent 
means became an unqualified physician whose mistake entailed the disability of a newborn child 
and (b.) how a person paying a bribe to a police officer might thus indirectly contribute to a system 
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that endangers the health of one’s own children. Respondents exposed to this video more often 
judged corruption to be a crime and evil and to have a negative impact on one’s health, security, the 
health care system and the economy of Ukraine. The other two videos conveyed a less emotional 
message but reported information on corruption in a way that resembles TV news reporting or 
documentaries. Specifically, the second video presented statistics on and information about 
countermeasures against corruption, while the third one discussed the legitimacy of academic 
cheating under certain circumstances. If anything, these two videos (and in particular the second 
one) appeared to promote (rather than reduce) understanding about the existence of corruption, 
although the comparably few statistically significant effects might be spurious due to multiple 
hypothesis testing. Our results thus suggest that presenting corruption issues in a catchy way, e.g. 
by means of a thrilling story that includes commonly known issues like bribing police officers, can 
be more effective for creating awareness about its negative consequences among students than a 
rational discussion of facts and figures.   
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Treatment effects based on machine learning 
 he paid on corruption ecology 
 
 est se pval est se pval est se pval 
corruption is a necessity -0.03 0.04 0.39 0.13 0.04 0.00 0.07 0.04 0.06 
 
...is a means to earn money -0.22 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.96 0.08 0.07 0.25 
 
...is a crime 0.09 0.04 0.03 -0.00 0.04 0.93 -0.06 0.04 0.12 
 
...is a part of life 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.15 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.06 0.19 
 
...way of solving problems -0.04 0.06 0.52 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.11 
 
...compensation for low 
salaries 
0.12 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.81 
 
...temporary phenomenon -0.07 0.06 0.23 0.06 0.06 0.31 0.00 0.06 0.97 
 
...tradition -0.03 0.07 0.67 -0.07 0.07 0.29 0.01 0.07 0.92 
 
...national peculiarity 0.02 0.07 0.80 -0.15 0.07 0.03 -0.05 0.07 0.49 
 
...evil 0.14 0.04 0.00 -0.03 0.04 0.48 -0.10 0.05 0.03 
 
...influences my career 0.06 0.04 0.14 0.02 0.04 0.54 0.06 0.04 0.09 
 
...my quality of life -0.00 0.04 0.99 0.01 0.04 0.80 0.04 0.04 0.28 
 
...my education -0.03 0.04 0.36 -0.00 0.04 0.93 0.04 0.04 0.31 
 
...my health -0.16 0.04 0.00 -0.01 0.04 0.86 0.09 0.04 0.03 
 
...my security -0.14 0.04 0.00 -0.05 0.04 0.18 0.02 0.04 0.62 
 
...influences Ukrainian 
economy 
-0.05 0.03 0.05 -0.02 0.03 0.50 0.02 0.03 0.56 
 
...Ukrainian politics -0.01 0.02 0.63 0.01 0.02 0.57 0.04 0.02 0.10 
 
...Ukrainian education 0.00 0.02 0.89 0.02 0.02 0.29 0.01 0.02 0.66 
 
...medicine in Ukraine -0.08 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.03 0.57 -0.01 0.03 0.71 
 
...Ukrainian law-enforcement 
system 
-0.00 0.02 0.84 -0.00 0.02 0.87 0.02 0.02 0.30 
 
Note: Estimates are based on the ‘lassoATE’ command of the ‘hdm’ package by Chernozhukov, Hansen and Spindler 
(2015) for the statistical software ‘R’. ‘mcontr’: mean of control group (education treatment); ‘est’: estimated effect 
(mean difference); ‘se’: heteroscedasticity robust standard error; ‘pval’: p-value of the effect. 
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Abstract
This paper presents the outcomes of an anti-corruption educational intervention among Ukrainian students based 
on an online experiment. More than 3,000 survey participants were randomly assigned to one of three different 
videos on corruption and its consequences (treatment groups) or a video on higher education (control group). The 
data suggest a high level of academic dishonesty and misconduct among young people, but also a negative attitude 
towards corruption in general, highlighting the ambivalence of corruption in the country. We find that one video, 
which presented a thrilling story about a victim of corruption related to common bribery in an accessible way, was 
effective in promoting awareness of the negative consequences of corruption. In contrast, the other two treatment 
videos, which more closely followed the style of TV news or documentaries on corruption, did not generally promote 
negative attitudes towards corruption. Presenting corruption issues in a catchy way therefore appears to matter for the 
effectiveness of such interventions.
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